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GLOBAL CRISIS, RECOVERY 
AND THE CHANGING WORLD
The global economic crisis that lasted mostly during the years 2008 
and 2009 has been the worst since the Great depression. Although statisti-
cally the crisis seems to be over in most regions, the way to recovery rea-
ching the pre-crisis levels will be long, painful and uncertain. It has to be 
pointed out that in some countries around the globe not even by the year 
2010 the crisis was not over. On the overall the rebound had been weak and 
globally uneven. There seems to be under way a strong shift of economic 
activities towards Asian countries. This is more than evident in the case of 
China and India. 
In order to evaluate the process of global development well, an under-
standing of this process prior to the crisis, the sources of the crisis, the effects 
of the crisis and the recovery path should be analyzed. In this paper the focus 
is on some of those issues.
In the fi rst chapter of the paper the global situation prior to the crisis 
and the effects of the crisis since its outbreak are examined. The scope are 
the main regions of the world and signifi cant countries underlining the dif-
ferences in development approaches, main factors of growth and the broad 
levels of global linkages facing them. The following chapter focuses on the 
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aspects and implicit polarization outcomes. In a world in which inequalities 
of income distribution and poverty are as it seems on the rise and have been 
aggravated by the crisis, invite for the reexamination of the basic theories 
at hand. This is being presented it the third chapter. The theories and espe-
cially the neo-liberal approach are being confronted by the facts offered by 
economic reality. The concluding remarks of the last chapter of the paper 
provide further questions on global federalism, the constraints and possibi-
lities under the implicit assumption that they might develop without drastic 
confrontations and radical nationalistic outbursts.
Key words: globalization, crisis, inequalities, liberalism, neo-Keyne-
sianism.
The global spread of the crisis
It is evident that since the outburst of the crisis the main economic regions 
and countries have been exposed to it differently. Prior to the crisis, growth by 
regions and countries differentiated considerably. The growth momentum and the 
effect of globalization did not bypass any of the countries that opened up to this 
process as it is illustrated in Table 1.
Although the crisis has affected the entire globe, the consequences were as 
well not uniform around the globe. This has been illustrated in table 2. Regions 
and large countries that were relatively less exposed to external sources of fi nanc-
ing and with a higher level of the share of consumption were somewhat better off. 
Unlike those, countries heavily dependent on external fi nancing of their growth 
were very strongly affected by the global crisis. Countries and regions with a 
strong export orientation faced soon a very strong drop for their export demand 
and thus a decline in their rates of growth. Thus different sources of growth and 
different development models have contributed to the differentiation with respect 
to the effects of the crisis and its outcomes.
The EU has faced a fi rst set back prior to the crisis with the rising oil prices 
on the global market. With the emergence of the crisis in the USA increasing fears 
about losses on the US related assets at major European banks caused wholesale 
markets to freeze soon after September 2008, with a number of large failing banks 
requiring state intervention. With initially limited fi scal and monetary responses of 
European governments, the initial problems caused broad repercussions. The main 
reason was the close linkages between Europe’s major fi nancial institutions and 
their high leverage. Countries with high booms suffered from a slash in residen-
tial investment what added to the problems (for example Ireland, Spain, Portugal, 
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Greece and the United Kingdom). Starting with the fi nancial problems, by the 
fourth quarter of 2008 the crisis broadened towards the real economy. Despite 
of a large fall in oil prices that occurred in the meantime, consumption declined, 
exports started declining, business investment slowed down signifi cantly and in 
spite of remedial fi nancial policies of the governments the crisis deepened during 
2009. This situation has badly hit most of the emerging European economies. 
Their development relied heavily on all kinds of capital infl ows and on export 
markets to developed European countries that contracted, thus exports, growth 
and government revenues worsened considerably. What followed were increasing 
rates of unemployment and increasing pressures on social transfers.
Table 1. 
SUMMARY OF THE WORLD OUTPUT PRIOR TO THE CRISIS*
Average
1991–2000
2004 2005 2006 2007
World 3.1 4.9 4.5 5.1 5.2
Advanced economies 2.8 3.2 2.6 3.0 2.7
United States 3.3 3.6 2.9 2.8 2.0
Euro area - 2.2 1.7 2.9 2.7
Japan 1.3 2.7 1.9 2.0 2.4
Other advanced 
economies**
3.5 4.0 3.3 3.9 4.0
Emerging and developing 
economies
3.6 7.5 7.1 8.0 8.3
Regional groups
   Africa 2.4 6.7 5.8 6.1 6.2
   Central and eastern 
   Europe
2.0 7.3 6.0 6.6 5.4
   Commonwealth of 
   Independent States***
- 8.2 6.7 8.4 8.6
   Developing Asia 7.4 8.6 9.0 9.8 10.6
   Middle East 4.0 6.0 5.8 5.7 6.3
   Western Hemisphere 3.3 6.0 4.7 5.7 5.7
* Real GDP; ** Excluding the United States, euro area countries, and Japan; *** Including 
Mongolia for reasons of geography and similarities in economic structure.
Source: World Economic Outlook, Crisis and Recovery, April 2009, IMF, Washington, DC.
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The EU started the rebound by the beginning of the year 2010 and this re-
bound was again distributed unevenly. This has been explained by the different 
macroeconomic positions with which the countries of the EU faced the crisis, the 
space for government interventions and different approaches of economic policy 
measures.
Other economies mostly Canada, Australia, New Zealand and most of the 
commodity exporting countries of Latin America and the Middle East have ben-
efi ted in recent years from highly favorable terms of trade, owing mainly to high 
prices for energy, minerals and food exports. Adverse terms of trade shocks that 
followed soon after the outbreak of the crisis have forced the policy makers to 
provide the economies with substantial fi scal stimulus. In spite of this, owing to 
relatively high dependence on demand from the United States, the EU and Asia 
and on external fi nancing, there are limits to what domestic policy measures can 
achieve. The rebound for those countries came only with a gradual increase in 
export demand which started very soon with the demand from China and to some 
extent from India.
Russia and the CIS countries suffered from multiple impacts on their econo-
mies. The fi rst one originated in the fi nancial sphere. Most of the countries relied 
on external funding and on the funding of nonfi nancial fi rms. With the outburst 
of the global crisis funding of investors started fading away thus, an increasing 
number of bad loans emerged. An additional pressure came from households 
which began switching from domestic to foreign currency denominated assets. 
Countries like Russia with larger amounts of foreign currency reserves managed 
for a while to buffer the impact on exchange rate. At the same time exports and ex-
port earning as well foreign remittances for countries with a high share of migrant 
workers added to the pressure on CIS economies. The problem was to maintain 
the confi dence in local currencies. Macroeconomic policies came into play, fi rst 
of all by drawing down the reserves. This was possible only for some countries 
with high export earnings of oil and gas which posted fi scal surpluses ahead of 
the crisis. However, for most CIS countries the fi nal outcome was allowing the 
exchange rates to depreciate. This followed most of the countries that at fi rst inter-
vened by drawing down the reserves. The problem that followed was an increase 
in the debt burden on nonfi nancial fi rms and households, especially in countries 
with a relatively higher share of foreign currency denominated credit in domes-
tic banks. Under the condition in which most of the countries were, there was a 
minimal space for fi scal policy measures. What followed were severe cutbacks 
in investment and employment adding to the already heavy social problems and 
social differentiation. 
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Table 2. 
WORLD OUTPUT DURING THE CRISIS AND FORECASTS 
FOLLOWING THE CRISIS*
2008 2009 2010 2014
World 3.2 –1.3 1.9 4.8
Advanced economies 0.9 –3.8 0.0 2.6
United States 1.1 –2.8 0.0 2.4
Euro area 0.9 –4.2 –0.4 2.3
Japan –0.6 –6.2 0.5 2.5
Other advanced economies** 1.2 –3.9 0.4 3.5
Emerging and developing 
economies
6.1 1.6 4.0 6.8
Regional groups:
   Africa 5.2 2.0 3.9 5.4
   Central and eastern 
   Europe
2.9 –3.7 0.8 4.0
   Commonwealth of 
   Independent States***
5.5 –5.1 1.2 5.3
   Developing Asia 7.7 4.8 6.1 8.8
   Middle East 5.9 2.5 3.5 4.5
   Western Hemisphere 4.2 –1.5 1.6 4.3
* Real GDP; ** Excluding the United States, euro area countries, and Japan; *** Including Mongolia 
for reasons of geography and similarities in economic structure.
Source: World Economic Outlook, Crisis and Recovery, April 2009, IMF, Washington, DC.
Unlike the EU, Russia and the CIS countries, Asian countries relied domi-
nantly on two main sources of growth - exports and domestic consumption the 
later being relevant for large countries like China and India. Therefore it could 
be expected that the impact of the crisis on those countries would be milder. 
Structures of their economies have a higher share of manufacturing and high ex-
port growth relies on it. Funding of the fi nancial sector is less dependent on for-
eign sources except for foreign direct investment. However the crisis has affected 
those economies as well. The impact was due to the heavy reliance on exports. 
With the collapse in export demand for consumer goods and capital goods the 
newly industrialized economies of Asia have been hurt badly. This is true to a far 
lesser extent for the economies of Chine and India. Those economies have been 
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affected by contraction in export demand. They kept growing due to the fact that 
exports have a smaller share in the economy. In addition, policy measures in those 
countries have supported public spending and consumption in general. Global 
fi nancial crisis had a spillover effect across Asia as well. This came with a time 
lag affecting equity and bond prices and a rise in interbank spreads as well. In 
most of the region’s emerging economies currencies have depreciated in order to 
support exports. Most of Asian economies have established strong economic fun-
damentals, high export growth, and considerable infl ows of FDI during a longer 
period before the outbreak of the crisis (IBRD, 1993). The effects of the crisis in 
2009 have reduced the rates of growth by 50% on the average for China, India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. ASEAN-5 countries have recorded zero growth rates 
on the average with negative ones for Thailand and Malaysia, while Vietnam and 
Thailand had positive growth following the pattern of the four leading countries 
in Asia. The heaviest blow experienced during 2009 suffered the newly industrial-
ized Asian economies for which the average rate was around -6%. 
Measures undertaken in most of Asian countries were directed at rebalanc-
ing the exports and investment towards public and private consumption. Those 
measures led on the overall towards lower levels of GDP decline and a shorter 
time span for the recovery to begin.
Prior to the crisis, African countries have been facing economic gains due to 
their exports and worker’s remittances. In spite of their relatively weak fi nancial 
linkages with advanced economies the spillovers of the crisis has affected those 
countries as well. The external shocks reduced the demand for African exports, 
caused a sharp fall in commodity prices in resource rich countries and curtailed 
worker’s remittances. Most of the countries face very tight external and domestic 
fi nancing constraints as well as reduced donor support. Thus, preserving the hard 
won gains in macroeconomic, growth and stability is facing a very severe test.
What can be concluded on the global scale is that different growth paths, 
factor endowments, different relative prices and economic policies on country 
levels have affected differently the global regions. This differentiation has led to 
a differentiated spread of the rebound from the crisis, but still until this moment 
to a group of ten countries including Croatia that are not yet out of the recession. 
Differentiation and poverty again on the agenda
Since 1970 until 2008 the world has been through 124 banking crisis, 208 
currency crises, 63 debtor crises, 42 double and 10 triple crises (World Bank, 
2010). According to Charles Kindleberger, fi nancial crisis have been occurring 
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every eight and a half years since 1725 in western capitalist economies (Polin, 
2009). Crises have become universal with a difference with respect to the devel-
oping countries. In those countries the crises lasted longer on the average than 
need and took a longer period for recovery. It caused increasing social costs as 
well as increasing poverty. However, those past crises have been limited to a given 
country or a region at the most. None of them have developed into a global crisis.
What is relevant for the last ten years prior to the outburst of the crisis was 
that global economic growth and economic development did not occur quite hand 
in hand. While growth marked signifi cant levels, economic development which 
involves economic growth as well as human development variables (such as life 
expectancy, health care, infant mortality, education, income distribution, access 
to resources, etc.) has been marked by a deterioration of those variables (Tridico, 
2010). The crisis emerged from a system that produced lasting and unsustainable 
inequalities in the society and thus hinders the long run sustainable, stable growth 
of the economy (Jurčić, 2010). High rates of growth of the global economy that 
have been recorded from 2002 until 2007 have brought economic gains but they 
were distributed unevenly around the globe. Even the more, this growth has not 
contributed to the growth of salaries and wages. During this period they were 
stagnating with their declining share in national income (International Labour 
Organization, 2008). With respect to the emerging and transition economies 
Tridico gives proof that the accelerated growth of those countries over the period 
1995-2006 did not bring about a process of development as stated above since the 
human development variables worsened for the same period (Tridico, 2010). 
In order to maintain and increase their standards of living the consumers 
started increasingly relying on bank loans. Changed conditions of bank and ex-
ternal fi nancing with such high levels of indebtedness trigger of the beginning or 
reinforced the crisis. This is the evidence from the recent global crisis.
The crisis brought the loss of jobs and savings; it reduced earnings of house-
holds and dramatic loss of property. The loans became scarce thus shrinking in-
vestment. The future became uncertain hence, consumers restrain from consump-
tion imputing a contraction in the real sector. The negative multiplier effects of 
the crisis were at work. Had the market done its role even during the crises, a 
total collapse would be unavoidable. In order to prevent it, governments inter-
vened. Keynesian economics were again in, it seems. It is evident that even under 
developed market economics and developed democratic systems the distribution 
of national wealth can be unequal (Jurčić, 2010). Under the liberal doctrine the 
rich became richer, while the poor poorer at the same time. Uneven distribution 
of wealth causes inequalities in the society and can be considered as the main 
sources of economic crises in industrial societies. In addition to that the evident 
economic cycles can easily be added to the sources of crises.
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Inequalities are evident between countries and within countries. Globalization 
has contributed to a high increase of the global GDP. However the distribution of 
this growth has created differentiation between the developed countries and the 
developing economies. So for example in the early sixties of last century the av-
erage GDP per capita of 20 most developed economies was around US $ 11,417 
while for the 20 least developed countries it was a mere US$ 212. Forty years 
later the same relationship was US$ 32,339: US$ 267 (World Bank, 2003). Such 
relationships indicate that globalization was benefi ciary for some, while for most 
it turned into a costly burden. This can easily turn into serious and permanent 
political tensions.
Since the outburst of the crisis governments started intervening since it became 
evident that the market by itself will not solve the problem unless a total collapse 
of the economies would be permitted. Thus fi scal and monetary stimulus of gov-
ernments has prevented the complete collapse. Banks and corporate sector have 
profi ted from those measures the most. Even if banks are excluded, the profi ts of 
S&P 500 companies were up by 18.7% last year. Recovery as it seems has benefi ted 
mostly the owners of capital. In the US it is the fi rst time that profi ts have outper-
formed wages in absolute terms in 50 years. In most of the leading economies the 
profi ts have risen by far more as compared to the increase in wages and in Britain 
the wages were practically stagnant (Economist, 2011). The Economist at this point 
reminds of Karl Marx by quoting from “Das Kapital” that: “ It follows therefore that 
in a proportion as capital accumulates, the situation of the worker, be his payment 
high or low, must grow worse” (Marx, 1958). The decline in labors’ share in income 
has been a long term trend for the OECD countries since 1980. The crisis and post 
crisis evidence shows that this trend has been accelerated. This decline has been 
accompanied by an increased inequality in incomes. According to The Economist 
mean wages have risen much faster than the median. It can be explained by the 
effect of globalization where there is a premium for talent but at the other end the 
fraction of labor force that cannot take the advantage of the changes in technology 
and especially of the IT revolution is gradually approaching the standards of their 
equals in the emerging economies. This questions some of the economic develop-
ment fundamentals, especially the heavy dependence on consumption as a source of 
growth. Deepening the service sector and a revival of the real sector seem to be the 
challenges of the growth model after the crisis.
Economic theories and economic reality
With the outburst of the Global crisis, the mainstream economists, the par-
tisans of free market and fi nancial deregulation have been forced to admit their 
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mistakes. Bailouts and various recovery programs are the lessons worth tens of 
billions of dollars going even into hundreds. This has become a clear indication 
that the mainstream economists are out of touch with the reality.
In efforts to understand and explain the sources of the crisis, to the surface 
have again brought into focus theories and theoreticians like Keynes and Minsky 
(Keynes, 1936; Minsky, 1986). In the search for explanations it has become evi-
dent how easily the mainstream line of thought has pushed aside the research on 
economic history and the history of economic thought, not to mention the issues 
related to the theory and policy of development economics. Thus it seems that 
we have neglected the problems of economic cycles, the problems of inherent 
instability of capitalist economies on which authors like Keynes and Minsky have 
indicated. Following their line of thought it comes out that the increase in deregu-
lation in the fi nancial sector leads to economic instability. In other words the nor-
mal functioning of fi nancial markets leads to the cycles of booms and busts and 
to the instability of economies. During the transition period of Eastern European 
societies a number of authors that analyzed the events cautioned on the dangers of 
market fundamentalism and the dangers of the fi nancial crisis for those countries 
(Horvat, 2002; Vojnić, 2010; Bogomolov, 2010). They had to wait until the ap-
pearance of the crisis to be red properly and to be understood as well. 
Economic theory that is impressed by the fi nancial institutions and their 
growing number of instruments (some of them being introduced to avoid laws 
and regulation) tends to put the blame on economic policy. The governments are 
to be blamed and everything is right with the dominant theory it seems by the 
representatives of this school.
The frequency and the number of bailouts and various recovery programs 
that have been used as countermeasures of preventing the spread of the crisis have 
clearly demonstrated the need for an active role of the state, as well as the need for 
more regulation in the free market. The additional lesson for the mainstream econ-
omists was that more insight in the operations of the fi nancial markets is needed. 
Astonishing is that the mainstream economists were unable to predict such 
a crisis and even more, the majority of them even thought that such an event is 
impossible. This originates from the doctrine itself, by which the neoclassical or 
the neoliberal school relies on the argument that “the market knows the best”. As 
it is known, Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu provided the mathematical proof 
of the existence of the “invisible hand” of Adam Smith, in the theory of general 
equilibrium (Arrow, K. and Debreu, G, 1954). One of the best nonmathematical 
defenders of this school was Friedrich August von Hayek the mentor of Milton 
Friedman. Hayek assumes that the knowledge is fragmented amongst individuals 
and that they communicate with their knowledge through the market. The state 
can have the biggest amount of knowledge but it does not know everything and 
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therefore any intervention of the state in the market leads to the limitation of 
knowledge about it (Hayek, 1944). In fi nancial theory, the liberal approach relies 
on the theory of effi cient markets. Since the stock prices are unpredictable on 
stock markets, it is therefore hard to beat the market because “the market knows 
the best”. The other statement related to this one is that “the market is always 
right”. The crisis offers more than one answer to those assumptions.
The theory of effi cient markets as a part of the liberal economic school start-
ed dominating after the seventies of the last century. Namely, until the seventies 
the Keynesian school was unable to give proper answers to the infl ationary pres-
sures caused by the oil shocks of that time. The neoliberal school led by Milton 
Friedman and his followers (the Chicago boys) emerged on the scene (Friedman, 
1953). Applied fi rst in Pinochet’s Chile followed by the governments of Margaret 
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan the liberal approach was introduced by the means of 
economic policies that aimed dominantly at deregulation of economies and priva-
tization of companies in state ownership.
A strong proponent of the liberal approach was Alan Greenspan who led the 
Federal Reserve over fi ve terms, and who just before the outburst of the crisis was 
considered by many as one of the most successful central bankers. Greenspan 
believed in the self-regulating forces of the market and acted that way. He and 
Summers, the economic advisor to the President, were against the regulation of 
new fi nancial instruments like the hedge funds, as well as the new fi nancial prod-
ucts, like the sub-prime mortgages. Lawrence Summers was one of the main par-
tisans in abolishing the Glass – Seagall’s law of 1933 by which the depository 
banks were separated from the investment banks and that contributed in addition 
to the whole mass.
Thus, with all the instruments, models and refi ned mathematical tools the 
liberal approach failed. The question is why? The answer seems to be in the as-
sumptions. The theory of effi cient markets relies on rational behavior of indi-
viduals and on the availability of information. With respect to the behavior of 
individuals by now there are many proofs that they are not entirely rational. They 
rely on habits, on euphoria and panic following the decisions of others for exam-
ple the market leaders. During the booms of the economy individuals are willing 
to invest while during the lows of the economy they are hesitant. This hesitancy 
of consumers and businesses contributes to the prolonged period for restoring the 
market confi dence. In addition, the well known asymmetry of information brings 
distortions in the functioning of the market. On this to the astonishment for some 
economists, the fi rst hint was given by Arrow in spite of delivering the mathemati-
cal proof of the existence of the invisible hand of Adam Smith. Stiglitz offered 
additional proof with respect to the problems of market imperfections caused by 
the asymmetry of information. The uneven distribution of information leads to 
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various irrational outcomes one of them being the “effect of the herd” by which 
individuals seem to follow the market leaders (Stiglitz, 2002). 
While Stiglitz and his followers offer the explanation that the markets need 
time to reach the new balance, Steve Keen (Keen, 1995) claims that the market is 
inherently unstable. According to him during the booms and busts the preferences 
of individuals change. A strong euphoria is followed by depression as economic 
growth enters into a crisis. This is based on the previously mentioned cyclical 
behavior of the economy. Nouriel Roubini goes even further with his statement 
that the self-regulation of the market means nothing else but the non-existence of 
regulation. By the beginning of 2008, he cautioned on a harsh crisis that can be 
expected (Roubini, 2008). He predicted twelve steps to total catastrophe of which 
most were fulfi lled while the rest were avoided due to government interventions. 
The lessons learned from the current crisis are with respect to the meas-
ures undertaken, leading to the following directions: increased control of fi nancial 
markets and international regulation of fi nancial markets. After the outburst of the 
crisis governments and central banks intervened on the markets in order to save 
the markets from themselves, thus from the total catastrophe. What followed were 
measures aimed at the reduction of deregulation. The USA has passed laws on the 
level of bank risk exposure while the Federal Reserve was given the possibility 
of takeovers of fi nancial corporations in trouble. In Great Britain the investment 
banks and depository (savings) banks are being split. The EU has set limits to the 
activities of hedge funds that contributed to the creation of panic during the crisis.
On the issue of international regulation of fi nancial markets there seems to be 
no essential progress until now. With respect to this the issue is the reexamination 
of the global economic and political system. The question is of the possibilities 
of reaching common agreements in a globally polarized world as it seems at this 
moment. In addition the global issues need a thorough reexamination of the cur-
rent theoretical postulates and paradigms with respect to growth and development.
Some thoughts on the perspectives of global development after the crisis
 
The process of globalization is pushing for increasing common standards 
and rules of the game in general. This is dominantly being brought forward within 
some broader economic integration like the EU. This association is developing 
rules, standards and institutions of common denomination. However even with-
in this association, as well as in some others, there is the issue of the nation-
state. National policymakers may not necessarily be inclined to go entirely along 
the criteria of international governance especially not if national preference di-
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verge from the common ones. The crisis has clearly demonstrated this problem. 
Interventions from the state level were readier sooner than the ones from the point 
of view of international economic governance be it from regional level (example 
of the EU) or the level of international institutions. It can be stated that as long 
as the nation-state remains the decisive factor the international economic govern-
ance, the process of globalization will be far from perfect. Stable international 
governance has to be capable to absorb national preferences. For them space and 
scope is needed on one hand, but on the other the international economic govern-
ance has to provide incentives for national preferences. The issue is therefore the 
conditions for the opt-outs or for the escape clauses that should be broader than 
the Agreement on Safeguards in the World Trade Organization.
By now it is understood that a set of rules is needed that encourage greater 
convergence of policies and standards on a voluntary basis. This process can be 
long but there is no better alternative as it seems. For greater economic integra-
tion the narrowing of normative i.e. jurisdictional differences is important. The 
voluntary based criteria should allow for suffi cient fl exibility to leave room for 
divergence in national norms and preferences under well defi ned conditions and 
criteria. This would contribute to the problem of dealing with uncertainty and 
changing circumstances.
The process of convergence can be a long one and there is the issue of short 
term choices. The bottom line is the question of the conditions under which the 
governments will give up some of their sovereignty and choose to empower the 
international organizations. The answer in theoretic terms is that this can be ex-
pected when the long-run benefi ts of cooperation are greater than the short-run 
benefi ts of unilateral action (Rodrick, 1998). When the outcome is in favor of 
long run benefi ts, then it would pay to give up some of the sovereignty. As long 
as nation states remain at the core of the international system, considerations on 
sustainability and diversity require selective disengagement from multilateral ar-
rangements. In the area of international fi nance the international institutions have 
developed numerous lists of standards and codes in the area of fi scal transparency, 
monetary and fi nancial policy, banking supervision, data dissemination, and cor-
porate governance and accounting standards. Some of them have still to be imple-
mented. In the area of international trade the scope of the current Agreement on 
Safeguards could be expanded to labor standards, the environment. In both areas 
the purpose of such an expanded scope would be to provide national governments 
with greater breathing room when events lead to this need. The conditions should 
be well defi ned and based on mutual agreement. Therefore the opt-outs should be 
built into the rules of international economic governance explicitly.
If we accept the fact that the economies are inclined to instability due to 
the cyclical and some other effects, then we can assume two possible long run 
scenarios with respect to the idea of developing the global federalism for which 
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different roles of the state is being implicitly offered. The fi rst one is that by as-
suming that nothing substantial will happen with the introduction of anticyclical 
measures and that hence there is a possibility of ongoing fi nancial crisis, we can 
expect the nation states to shell themselves and fi nd ways and means to intro-
duce different forms of protectionism. In that case economic and other forms of 
international integration will have its ups and downs, prolonging the issue of fur-
ther integrations. Looking at the process of global development from the point 
of view of further improvements in global market instruments and institutions as 
well by reducing the inequalities we could expect that an increasing part of the 
world’s population will benefi t from the advantages that the globalization can 
provide. It can be expected that the continuing technological progress will foster 
international integration imposing new possibilities and new standards globally. 
This implies a system of mixed economy in which a defi ned role of the state is 
indispensable. An alliance of convenience based on a consensus to the benefi ts of 
all could be foreseen. In that case the world of “winners” and “losers” could fade 
away as mutual confi dence increases. This should be underpinned by the realiza-
tion of supranational regulations, rules and standards. For such a scenario a model 
of federal political system has to be developed, or is that just another Utopia? The 
answer could be “depending on our ability to devise domestic and international 
institutions that render economic globalism compatible with the principles of the 
mixed economy” (Rodrik, 2007). 
Concluding remarks
 
The future of globalization is unquestionable. The question is where it is 
heading and at what speed. The answers are many and some of them can be fore-
seen while some others are still open to discussions and agreements on the inter-
national level. The sources of the crisis, the crisis itself and the expected rebound 
are related to the theoretical options for the choice of the development path. The 
market fundamentalism with the diminishing role of the state and forced dereg-
ulation has received a serious setback. Evidence shows that the neo-Keynesian 
school can offer some solutions and that a consensus on the level of regulation 
and institutional strengthening is needed. A world in which polycentric factors are 
present and in which the issue of national and global income distribution has to 
be improved, there is a need to assure a win-win solution. To assure it a model of 
consensus building based on the alliance of convenience has to be applied. How 
the outcome might be depends on realistic assumptions under which a political 
will on the global level has to be expressed. That would enable a proper adjust-
ment on the global jurisdictional level, economic and social levels. It is a long run 
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approach by which higher levels of internationalization could be expected. In such 
a framework the position and the role of the nation state will change considerably 
but should not fade away entirely. Polycentric development should enable the nation 
state for a new role in which well defi ned degrees of fl exibility could be defi ned.
REFERENCES
Arrow, K. and G. Debreu, (1954.), “Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium for a 
Competitive Economy”, Econometrica, Vol. 22, No.3, pp. 265-290. 
Bogomolov, T.O.,( 2010.), “Pouka globalne krize”, Ekonomski pregled, (61), 5-6: 
335-353.
Friedman, M., (1953.), Essays in Positive Economics, Chicago Press.
Hayek, F.A., (1944.), The Road to Serfdom, Rutledge.
Horvat, B., 2002, “Transition and Restoration: Two Alternative Strategies” in: 
Young A. et al. (eds.) Economies in Transition – Conception, Status and 
Prospects,  World Scientifi c, p. 31-62.
IBRD, (1993.) The East Asian Miracle, Oxford University Press.
International Labour Organization, (2008.), Global Wage Report, 2008/9, Geneva.
International Monetary Fund, (2009.), “World Economic Outlook, Crisis and 
Recovery”, 4/2009, Washington, DC.
Jurčić, Lj., (2010.), “Financijska kriza i fi skalna politika”, Ekonomski pregled, 
(61), 5-6: 317-334.
Keynes, J.M., (1936.), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Marx, K., (1958.), Kapital.  Beograd: Kultura.
Minsky, H.P., (1986.), Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New York: McGraw Hill 
Professional.
Polin, R., (2009.), “Tools for a New Economy: Proposals for a fi nancial regulatory 
system”, Boston Review.
Rodrik, D., (1998.), “The Debate over Globalization: How to Move Forward by 
Looking Backward”, In Launching Global Trade Talks: An Action Agenda. 
Special Report no. 12. Rodrik, D.,( 2007.), One Economics, Many Recipes: 
globalization, institutions, and economic growth, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton.
Roubini, N., (2008.), Economonitor.
LJ. JURČIĆ, I. TEODOROVIĆ: Global Crisis, Recovery and the Changing World
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 62 (5-6) 233-247 (2011) 247
Stiglitz, E.J., (2002.), Globalization and Its Discontents, W.W. Norton & Company.
The Economist, “Buttonwood”, March 26th – April 1st, 2011.
Tridico, P., 2010, “Growth, inequality and poverty in emerging and transition 
economies”, In: Cvijanović V. et al. (Eds.),  Cognitive Capitalism and its 
Refl ections in South-Eastern Europe,  Peter Lang Internationaler Verlag der 
Wissenschaften.
Vojnić, D., (2010.), “Kriza suvremenog kapitalizma (s posebnim osvrtom na kri-
zu realnog socijalizma i samoupravnoga socijalizma)”, Ekonomski pregled, 
(61), 5-6: 293-316.
World Bank, (2010.), Global Economic Prospects: Finance and Growth.
GLOBALNA KRIZA, OPORAVAK I SVIJET KOJI SE MIJENJA
Sažetak
Globalna ekonomska kriza koja je bila očitija tijekom godine 2008. i godine 2009. 
bila je najteža od Velike svjetske krize. Iako statistički izgleda da je najteže razdoblje krize 
prošlo, put oporavka iz krize na razine iz predkriznih vremena po svemu sudeći biti će 
dugotrajan, bolan i neizvjestan. Pri tome valja istaknuti da neke države svijeta nisu izašle 
iz krize niti u godini 2010. Promatrano u cjelini dosadašnji globalni oporavak bio je slab 
i neujednačen. Diferencijacija globalnog ekonomskog rasta ukazuje da se odvija snažan 
pomak gospodarskih aktivnosti u pravcu zemalja Azije. To je najočitije kada se promatraju 
države poput Kine i Indije.
Da bi se donio sud o procesu globalnog razvitka, potrebno je razumjeti procese raz-
vitka u razdoblju prije krize, utvrditi bitna izvorišta krize kao i procijeniti učinke krize te 
razmotriti mjere izlaska iz krize. Ovaj rad usredotočio se je na neka od ovih pitanja.
U prvom se dijelu rada razmatraju prilike prije izbijanja krize kao i učinci krize po 
njenom izbijanju. Promatraju se glavne ekonomske regije svijeta kao i ključne države 
sa ciljem da se ukaže na razlike u pristupu razvitku, na glavne čimbenike rasta i bitne 
razine globalnih odnosa koji su uspostavljeni. U drugom poglavlju rada se razmatra po-
javu globalne polarizacije i njene učinke. U svijetu u kojem dohodovne nejednakosti i 
siromaštvo čine konstantu, s pojavom krize i njenim posljedicama ove su se najednako-
sti samo pogoršale. Takvo je stanje izazov za preispitivanje prevladavajućih razvojnih 
teorija, o čemu se razmatra u trećem dijelu rada. U tom se dijelu neo-liberalna teorija 
sučeljava sa činjenicama iz ekonomske stvarnosti te se ukazuje na potrebu i načine reviz-
ije takvog pristupa. Zaključni dio razmatra neke ideje s pogledom unaprijed u kojem se 
traži drugačiji pristup razvojnoj teoriji kao i jasniji odnos države odnosno nacije u njenom 
širem okruženju. Moguće rješenje vidi se u globalnom federalizmu u svjetlu ograničenja 
i mogućnosti koje se mogu pojaviti na tom putu, a da se pri tom izbjegnu drastične kon-
frontacije i radikalne nacionalističke tendencije.
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